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The idea that «natural» environments should be protected is a relatively recent one. This 
new attitude is reflected in the activities of preservation and restoration of natural 
environments, ecosystems, flora and wildlife that, when scientifically based, can be defined 
as conservation. In this paper, we would like to examine the framework of values behind 
these activities. More specifically, we would like to show that there is no single specific 
reason that can justify conservation in each of its manifestations It is therefore necessary to 
adopt a complex framework of values, which must be composed carefully, since many of 
the canonical arguments used to justify conservation provide, when combined together, an 
incoherent or, at least, incomplete set of reasons. One way to avoid these inconsistencies or 
incompleteness is, in our view, to adopt, in conjunction with the classic economic and 
ecological arguments for conservation, a set of arguments  appealing to the importance of 
nature for human flourishing.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The idea that «natural»1 environments should be protected, preserved and, 
when possible, restored, is a relatively recent one. From being considered 
worthless (“land that is left wholly to nature”, wrote John Locke, “is called, as 
indeed it is, waste”2), the areas of the planet where anthropization is scarce are 
nowadays considered valuable by many people, and precious is considered the 
diversity of life – biodiversity3 – expressed by the richness of species, 
populations, genetic heritage, and adaptations of the living world. This new 
attitude is reflected in the activities of preservation and restoration of natural 
environments, ecosystems, flora and wildlife that, when scientifically based, 
can be defined as conservation4. 
In this paper, we would like to examine the framework of values behind 
these activities. More specifically, we would like to show that there is no single 
specific reason that can justify conservation in each of its manifestations, and 
that  can allow us to prioritize ethical conflicts arising from its practice. It is 
therefore necessary to adopt a complex framework of values, which must be 
composed carefully, since many of the canonical arguments used to justify 
conservation provide, when combined together, an incoherent or, at least, 
incomplete set of reasons. One way to avoid these inconsistencies or 
incompleteness is, in our view, to adopt, in conjunction with the classic 
economic and ecological arguments for conservation, a set of arguments  
appealing to the importance of nature for human flourishing. By this latter 
expression we mean the development and thriving of the human persona in 
his or her emotional, intellectual, and moral qualities, according to both our 
individual and specie-specific potential. 
 
1 «Nature» e «natural» are extremely complex and ambiguous words. In this paper we will 
not try to define exactly what is a «natural environment» and what distinguish it from an  
«artificial environment». 
2 J. Locke, Two Treatises on Government, in The Works of John Locke in Ten Volumes, 
Scientia Verlag Aalen, London, 1963, vol. V, p. 362. 
3 Biodiversity is another complex word resisting definitions. In this paper we will use 
biodiversity in its simple, if somehow vague, meaning of  «diversity of life in all its forms». For a 
deeper discussion on the issue see: M. Oksanen & J. Pietarinen, Philosophy and Biodiversity, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004; S. Sarkar, Biodiversity and Environmental 
Philosophy. An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005; J. MacLaurin & K. 
Sterelny, What is Biodiversity?, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2008. 
4 Examples of activities of this kind are, for instance, management of wildlife in national 
parks, ex situ breeding programs, field research and data gathering focused on protecting 
endangered species, seed and genetic banks, conservation education, etc. 
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Before examining the issue, it is a legitimate question to ask why we need 
such a discussion – in a nutshell, what are the reasons for asking for reasons. It 
may be argued, for instance, that the environmental crisis and the climate 
change that our planet is currently experiencing are producing effects so 
evident and pervasive as to constitute immediate and self-justifying reasons in 
favor of conservation. Such an objection is in part justified. Yet it does not take 
into account the practical functions of critical reasoning regarding the value of 
conservation. 
The first important practical function concerns ethical conflicts. Often, 
conservation practices bring about conflicts with other moral and social issues, 
such as development, economic growth, welfare and quality of life of human 
beings and other sentient creatures, etc. In order to analyze and disentangle 
these conflicts, we need a clear, well-articulated, and comprehensive map of 
the values involved. 
The second important practical function is related to the issues of 
communication and education. A well-defined map of the values involved in 
conservation helps conservationists to better communicate the reasons for, and 
the necessity of, their work, and to build a comprehensive view of the 
relationship between nature and human beings which can be used to influence 
and educate public opinion. Moreover, solid arguments in favor of 
conservation can help to attract more resources and new energy. 
The third important practical function concern prioritization of 
conservation practices. Conservation is a scientific enterprise – based on 
biology, and in particular on ecology. However, its goal is practical, meaning 
with this that its ultimate end is action. As such, conservation, as noted by 
Michael Soulé5, is a «crisis discipline», which stands to biology in the same way that 
surgery and war stand respectively to physiology and politics. Crisis disciplines operate 
in difficult and uncertain contexts: usually their practitioners do not have complete 
information on the issues they are dealing with, and have to quickly establish their 
priorities as they cannot pursue the ideal solution, but only sub-optimal compromises. 
As such, a clear map of values involved in conservation is needed in order to quickly 
adjust and prioritize goals. 
In the rest of this paper, we will proceed as follow. In the following paragraph we 
will examine intrinsic value as a possible source of arguments for justifying 
conservation (par. 2). Next we will analyze the reach of economic (par. 3) and 
ecological (par. 4) reasons for conservation. In the second part of the paper we will 
examine reasons for conservation based on human flourishing (par. 5) and we will 
sketch their interaction with the reasons analyzed in the first part (par. 6). 
 
5 M.E. Soulé, What is Conservation Biology?, «Bioscience» 35-11 (1985), reprinted in M.E. 
Soulé, Collected Papers of Michael Soulé. Early Years in Modern Conservation Biology, Island 
Press, Washington DC 2014. 
530       PIERFRANCESCO BIASETTI & BARBARA DE MORI 
 
2.  INTRINSIC VALUE OF NATURE 
The origins of the contemporary debate on nature's value can be traced 
back to the theories of «intrinsic value» developed by the first generation of 
environmental philosophers during the 1960s. Following their zeitgeist,6 these 
philosophers set themselves to the ambitious task of revolutionizing ethics on a 
new basis with new principles. They hoped to this, in particular, by attributing 
intrinsic value to nature. Traditional moral thought had assigned intrinsic 
value only to persons; philosophers building the ground for contemporary 
animal ethics argued for an extension of this kind of value to sentient non-
human animals.7 the first wave of environmental philosophers argued for 
something much more radical: something which did not involve a simple 
extension of the «expanding circle» of ethics – as did the classic model of 
moral progress proposed by Peter Singer8 – but the application of a category 
usually adopted for individuals to the holistic dimension of the biotic 
community9. 
The strengths of this «ecocentric» proposal are evident: by assigning an 
intrinsic value to nature, environmental policies gain, from a moral 
standpoint, a crucial level of importance, one which is able to outweigh 
utilitarian arguments and to trump all the other considerations coming from 
shifting social and cultural contexts. Some conservation biologists, including 
one of the founding fathers of the field, Michael Soulé, flirted for a long time 
 
6 Dale Jamieson in his Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic, «Environmental 
Values» 7-1 1998, reprinted in Morality's Progress. Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the 
Rest of Nature, Clarendon, Oxford 2002, p. 199, describes the nexus between environmental 
philosophy and the zeitgeist of those years: “The origin of the contemporary environmental 
movement were deeply entangled in the counter-culture of the 1960s. Generally in the counter-
culture there was a feeling that sex was good, drugs were liberating, opposing the government 
was a moral obligation, and that new values were needed to vindicate sustain, and encourage 
this shift in outlook and behavior (…). Only by overthrowing (…) traditions and embracing the 
suppressed insight of other traditions could we come to live peaceably with nature”. 
7 See the classic book by P. Singer, Animal Liberation, Harper, New York 1975 as well as T. 
Regan, The Case for animal Rights, University of California Press, Berkeley 1983. For a 
reconstruction see D. Jamieson, Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethics, cit. 
8 P. Singer, The Expanding Circle. Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1981. 
9 See the deep ecology of A. Naess (The Shallow and the Deep. Long-range Ecology 
Movement, «Inquiry» 16 1973), the land ethic of J.B. Callicott (In Defense of the Land Ethic: 
Essays in Environmental Philosophy, SUNY Press, New York 1989), and the theory of H. 
Rolston III (Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia 1988). A great influence on these theories (especially on 
Callicott) came from A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1949. 
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with this ethical approach,10 and empirical research shows that it is still 
widespread among conservationists.11 The idea of intrinsic value theories has 
made even into official statements – such as, for instance, the preamble to the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity. In our view, however, this success has 
been more a result of rhetoric than of solid argumentation. If we were to 
hazard a psychological explanation for this phenomenon, then perhaps the 
reason why intrinsic value theories are valued by conservationists – who are of 
course naturally inclined to believe that protecting nature is a noble and 
elevated task – is because they give a certain philosophical «authority» to their 
personal beliefs. When carefully examined, though, theories of intrinsic value 
prove to be, on the one hand, too abstract, and, on the other hand, too 
reductionist. 
Historically, the first wave of environmental philosophy could be seen as 
part of a general process in ethics – one which started in the second half of the 
last century – that saw a «return» of the debate from abstract metaethic 
questions to normative and practical issues – a process that gave rise to the 
phenomenon of «applied ethics». However, when the first environmental 
philosophers had to elaborate the details of their new theories of intrinsic 
value, they were forced to go against this current – in an attempt to give a 
plausible metaethical account of their revolutionary tenets.12 In fact, features 
usually considered necessary to the attribution of intrinsic value – such as 
rationality, sentience, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, have interests, 
preferences, desires, etc – can be attributed to species, ecosystems, or the biotic 
community only in a metaphorical sense. To justify the attribution of intrinsic 
value to any ecological category, it is necessary to accept an «ontological 
gestalt»13 between individuals and holistic entities of some kind. However, it is 
 
10 One of the normative postulate proposed by M. Soulé in a fundamental conservation 
biology paper assigns intrinsic value to the diversity of life, as for the environmental philosophy 
of that times (What is Conservation Biology?, cit., pp.43-44). 
11 At least in England: see T.G. Butler & T.G. Acott, An Inquiry Concerning the Acceptance 
of Intrinsic Value of Nature, «Environmental Value» 16 2007. 
12 For a review of the different meaning of intrinsic value in environmental philosophy see: 
J. O'Neill, The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, «The Monist» 75-2 1992. Some authors have 
claimed that the excess of metaethical discussion around the notion of intrinsic value has 
diverted the focus of environmental philosophy from the truly important issues of this 
discipline. For an example of this kind of critique, see  B.G. Norton, Toward Unity Among 
Environmentalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991. An attempt to reformulate anew the 
notion can be found in K. McShane, Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn't Give Up on Intrinsic 
Value, «Environmental Ethics» 29 2007. 
13 On this «ontological gestalt» see A. Naess, The World of Concrete Contents, «Inquiry» 28 
1985, partially reviewed in The Ecology of Wisdom, Counterpoint, Berkeley 2008. On the 
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rather difficult to justify this shift in ontology without falling into some 
abstruse metaphysical position. 
Perhaps this metaphysical oddity could be accepted if there were solid 
arguments for justifying the necessity of this ontological gestalt. However, 
there seems to be few arguments, and they are not very convincing. The most 
important argument probably derives from certain interpretations of 
Routley/Sylvan's famous thought experiment14. Imagine observing a human 
being who, for some reason, is the last human being on Earth. Now imagine 
that this person starts to wantonly destroy the natural environment around her 
for no apparent reason. She is not hurting – directly or indirectly – other 
human beings, yet we may have the feeling that her actions are still wrong. 
Outgoing from this moral intuition, we may derive the idea that nature's value 
does not depend on us – it is inherent in things. 
There are, however, other possible interpretations of this intuition. The 
thought experiment, on the one hand invite us to imagine a world where we do 
not exist, and on the other hand calls us to make a judgment on something 
happening within it. There is something fishy about this: we are not there – in 
fact we are not anywhere in that world – yet we watch and judge. Moreover, the 
neutrality of the judgment we are called to make is questionable. Put in front 
of a similar case where the last person on Earth is destroying a Lamborghini, a 
fan of sport cars could feel something similar to what we feel when we face the 
original experiment. Now, few people would claim that a Lamborghini has 
intrinsic value: why, then, should we trust our feelings in the other case, given 
the metaphysical extravagance of attributing intrinsic value to non-rational 
and non-sentient entities? 
Moreover, aside from being abstract and imposing several metaphysical 
demands, theories of intrinsic value are rather reductionist in concern to their 
practical applications. The idea that the biotic community possesses an 
intrinsic, unconditional value can be very interesting to discuss in a classroom 
in a philosophy department, but do not appear to provide any basis 
whatsoever in the management of ethical conflicts faced by conservationists. 
The major ethical issues in conservation arise from the necessity, on the one 
hand, of ordering priorities between different conservation policies, and, on 
the other hand, of balancing the need for conservation with other ethical 
demands coming from respect for people, communities, and animal welfare. 
 
problems of applying intrinsic value to holistic categories see B. Morito, Intrinsic Value: A 
Modern Albatross for the Ecological Approach, «Environmental Values» 12 2003. 
14 R. Sylvan/Routley, Is There a Need for a New, Environmental Ethic?, in «Proceedings of 
the 15th World Congress of Philosophy» vol. 1, Sophia Press, Sophia 1973. 
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Conservation ethics is, in this sense, a rather complicated affair which must 
take into consideration different kinds of value. However, theories of intrinsic 
value tend to invariably fall into some form of “environmental fascism”, as 
Tom Regan had phrased it at the dawn of the debate,15 in order to be coherent 
with their premises. 
The latest environmental philosophy has been able to take new routes in 
order to face the challenges of the ecological crisis, and has largely abandoned 
the eco-centric programs found at the beginning of the field. Different 
strategies to justify the attribution of value to the natural world have been 
formulated – strategies which take off from a less pretentious standpoint: that 
of anthropocentric value. These arguments can be divided into three broad 
categories: economic value, ecological value, and flourishing value. 
3. ECONOMIC VALUE OF NATURE 
The first category of instrumental value justifies conservation of nature for 
economic reasons. The basic idea is that conservation practices are 
investments that lead to positive economic returns, and that it is possible to 
divide this category into three subcategories. According to the first kind of 
economic argument, nature is a warehouse, that is, a repository of resources 
which can be exploited (in a sustainable way). The second kind of economic 
argument likens nature to a playground where human beings can enjoy a vast 
set of recreational activities. For the third kind of argument, nature is a magic 
box, which should be preserved for the “option value” of its content – because, 
in other words, any aspect of nature could one day reveal itself as an economic 
asset. 
At least on paper, these arguments are strong, as they appeal on a powerful 
kind of motivation – economic self-interest. However, if we look at them 
closely, we find that they have few applications. This is particularly true for the 
first subcategory – nature as a warehouse. The majority of species and natural 
environments has an indefinite, small, or null economic value. In other cases, 
the economic value of a species or of an environment, although existent, does 
not justify the investment one should take in order to exploit the resource in a 
sustainable way: it could be more profitable, for the homo oeconomicus, to 
exhaust the resource and reinvest the profit in another business with a higher 
profit margin. «Nature as a warehouse» arguments, in practice, work only 
when there exist a very favorable combination of a) economic value; b) 
 
15 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, cit. 
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profitability on the long term; c) scarce market fluctuation in the demand of 
the resource. With some exceptions,16 such favorable conditions are not very 
representative of the normal interaction between market economies and 
nature. 
Similar limitations can also be found in the second subcategory – nature as 
a playground. The recreational value offered by nature is unquestionable. 
Many people like to spend their free time outdoors, walking, hiking, camping, 
climbing, swimming, snorkeling, skiing, fishing, hunting, etc. This activities 
provide economic well-being to many communities and create profits and jobs, 
however it is not so obvious that this results in some direct or indirect 
advantage for nature. Many recreational activities are highly invasive to 
natural spaces: trees are cut to make room for sky slopes, resorts are built in 
order to house tourists, and the mere presence of too many people can have 
negative effects on natural environments. Moreover, there are usually no 
substantial economic gains to be spent on conservation coming from 
recreational practices: some practices, such as ecotourism,17 and, in limited 
contexts, hunting are exceptions, but are not the general rule.18 
The third category, that is, nature as a magic box, is the weakest, despite 
our initial impressions. In fact, it is a rather popular argument, with 
undoubted rhetorical power. Yet it has a very weak structure and its premises 
are empirically unsubstantiated. Let us start with the first issue: the argument 
that nature ought to be preserved because we do not know which incredible 
discovery we could made in the future is weak, because it is basically 
structured as an argument from ignorance, and as such, its strategy is to move 
surreptitiously the burden of proof. We cannot know a priori that some 
particular bit of nature could not prove to be useful one day. However, we may 
have good a posteriori reasons to advance such claims. For instance, regardless 
of whatever we may still discover about polar bears (Ursus maritimus), it is 
rather unreasonable to invest in their conservation (a very expensive affair, 
given the dissolution of their natural habitat due to climate change) on the 
 
16 It is the case, for instance, of vicuna (Vicugna vicugna): the economic value of its wool is 
fundamental for its conservation. 
17 See, for instance, C. Sekercioglu, Ecosystems Functions and Services, in N. Sodhi & P. 
Ehrlich, Conservation Biology for All, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010. 
18 The issue of the relationship between hunting and conservation is debated. The majority 
of environmental philosophers supporting theories of intrinsic value usually share a favorable 
view of hunting – since they place value on the biotic community, and not on the individual 
animal. From the standpoint of instrumental value, the issue can be instead dealt with by a 
more pragmatic approach. For an analysis of the issue see A.J. Loveridge, J.C. Reynolds & J.M. 
Milner Gulland, Does Sport Hunting Benefit Conservation?, in D.W. MacDonald & K. Service, 
Key Topics in Conservation Biology, Blacwell, Oxford 2007. 
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grounds that there could be a future crucial discovery. Conservation, as we 
have stressed, is a crisis discipline: we need to set definite priorities and not 
pretend to be in any condition to try and save everything. For these reasons, 
hard choices regarding allocation of human and economic resources need to 
be dealt with, and the magic box argument offers no help for this task, as its 
assumptions are that every bit of nature is potentially important in a future 
more or less distant. 
The major weakness of this argument lies, however, in the possibility of 
overturning its logic. Nature does not only offer good surprises: it also offers 
bad, and sometimes very bad, surprises. This can lead to the opposite 
conclusion that we ought not to conserve nature, because, by doing in this way, 
we could prevent bad surprises from coming out of the magic box. There is a 
chance, for instance, that if we had systematically destroyed the African 
tropical forest many years ago, we could have eradicated Ebola before the first 
epidemic. 
4. ECOLOGICAL VALUE OF NATURE 
The second category of instrumental value justifies conservation because of 
the essential services for the survival of life on our planet provided by 
ecosystems – services such as, for instance, air purification, climate stability, 
pollination, water purification, detoxification and decomposition of waste, soil 
fertility, etc. These services ensure the stability and the continuation of Earth's 
life cycle, and, in this way, our survival as a species: for this reason, we should 
be concerned about the health of ecosystems, just as we are for the conditions 
of the car we use for driving, or for the roof and walls of the house in which we 
live. 
The capacity of this argument to ground environmental policies, and more 
specifically conservation policies, is widely debated. This debate does not stem 
from doubts about the importance of ecosystem services, but rather  because it 
is not clear how far can we extend the reach of this argument. According to 
some, it has an unlimited reach, since there is a strong link between 
biodiversity and ecosystem services: the efficiency of an ecosystem, and its 
stability, both depend on the extent of its biodiversity in terms of species 
richness. A famous analogy illuminates this thesis. The species of an ecosystem 
are like the rivets that hold together a plane:19 lose a rivet, and nothing will 
happen, lose another one, and the structure will still maintain its capacity to 
 
19 The argument was first formulated in P.R. Ehrlich & A.H. Ehrlich, Extinction: The 
Causes and Consequences of the Disappearence of Species, Random House, New York 1981. 
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function properly; this can happen even if a third and a fourth rivet is lost, and 
so on: however, beyond a certain threshold, the accumulation of losses will 
increase the chances of an irreparable structural damage. The same is true for 
ecosystems: they can lose some pieces without being damaged in their 
structure and functions, but beyond a certain threshold, the situation become 
the analogue of an ecological Russian roulette, wherein there is a certainty that 
something bad will happen, even if nobody knows when. 
Like all analogies, even this one should be taken with a grain of salt. The 
basic idea of the rivet argument is that the value of a species depends on its 
providing of a functional redundancy to the whole ecosystem, yet things are 
much more complicated. In fact, there are at least three variables that can 
influence the complex relationship between species, ecosystems, and 
ecosystems services. The first variable is the importance of a species20 for the 
overall stability of an ecosystem. The second is the species' ability to shape the 
ecosystem. The third is its contribution to the services provided by the 
ecosystem, which can be, on the one hand, indirect – that is, produced by the 
species' contribution to the ecosystem's structure and stability – or direct – as 
when a service is provided firsthand by a species. The rivet argument – and, 
more generally, any idea of a strict correlation between ecosystem services and 
its species richness – confuses all the previous variables, by conflating direct 
contribution with indirect contribution, and reducing indirect contribution to 
a mere functional redundancy, making in this way species richness to be the 
only important issue regarding an ecosystem's structure and stability. The 
reason for this simplification stems from two holistic assumptions implicitly 
adopted in the analogy. On the one hand, the argument undervalues the 
differential contribution that different species can give to the structure and the 
stability of an ecosystem. On the other hand, the argument attributes to the 
whole properties of its parts: it is only in a broad sense that we can say that 
ecosystems provide services, as what directly provide services are, in fact, 
single and specific parts of it. 
The first implicit assumption is contradicted by the fact that, according to 
models more complex than those adopted by the rivet argument,21 not all 
 
20 Or of a population, or of a process. To avoid complications, we should refer here only to 
species. However, a great part of the following reasoning can be applied also to populations and 
processes.   
21 As, for instance, seen in the extended keystone hypothesis of C.S Holling (see his Cross-
scale Morphology, Geometry and Dynamics of Ecosystems, «Ecological Monographs» 62-4 
1992) or the drivers and passengers hypothesis di B. Walker (Biological Diversity and 
Ecological Redundancy, «Conservation Biology» 6 1992 and Conserving Biological Diversity 
Through Ecosystem Resilience, «Conservation Biology» 9 1995). 
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species share the same value in shaping and preserving an ecosystems: in fact, 
this is the reason why ecologists have created the categories of ecosystem 
engineers and keystone species to designate certain particular species22. Not all 
species, therefore, share the same ecological value: some rivets are more 
important than others.23 
The second assumption is contradicted by the fact that services are, in a 
strict sense, provided by parts of the ecosystem, and not by the ecosystem as a 
whole. In fact, a large part of ecosystem services are provided by bacteria, 
plants, and invertebrates, and in very few cases there is a significant 
contribution by vertebrates – including the majority of vertebrate on the verge 
of extinction.24 Moreover, some species may give a negative direct contribution 
to the ecosystem services, by providing disservices, at least from an 
anthropocentric standpoint: this is the case, for instance, for pathogenic 
microorganisms. 
Even if limited, the analogy between the species of an ecosystem and the 
rivets of an airplane still contains a wise precautionary principle. However, this 
 
22 In a review of the literature on the issue R. Thompson and B. M. Starzomski conclude 
that “much evidence points to a strong role for dominant species (e.g. keystone species or 
ecosystem engineers) in controlling ecosystem function” – see T. Thompson & B.M. 
Starzomski, What does Biodiversity Actually Do? A Review for Managers and Policy Makers, 
«Biodiversity and Conservation» 16-5 2006. 
23 The rivet argument is ambiguous for another reason: it is grounded on an engineering 
idea of resilience. According to Holling (Engineering Resilience Versus Ecological Resilience, 
in P. Schulze, Engineering within Ecological Constraints, National Academy, Washington DC 
1996) there is a difference between engineering resilience and ecological resilience. On the 
issue, see also G. Peterson, C.G. Allen & C.S. Holling, Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity and 
Scale, «Ecosystems» 1 (1998). 
24 See for instance D. Maier, What's So Good About Biodiversity? A Call for Better 
Reasoning About Nature's Value, Springer, Dordrecht 2012. However, many vertebrates can be 
classified as ecosystem engineers or keystone species, and as such can possess a high indirect 
value concerning the provision of ecosystem services. As J. MacLaurin and K. Sterelny writes 
(What is Biodiversity?, cit. , p. 169):  “In most ecosystems a very small proportion of species 
have very high interactivity (they are either keystones or dominant species) and we know what 
sort of interactions are typical of such species. These include mutualism such as pollination and 
seed dispersal. Effective predation is another typical keystone interaction, preventing 
overbrowsing and resultant simplification and even destruction of ecosystems (…). Niche 
construction by ecosystem engineers such as beaver (Castor canadensis) and elephants 
Loxodonta africana) is another keystone interaction. These strong interactions are not dotted 
randomly through phylogeny. They are more common in some taxa than others. For example, 
keystone species are often mammals; (…) there is a systematic tendency for species coposed of 
organisms that have high metabolic demands (as mammals do) to play a disproportionate role 
in structuring biological systems (…). These animals – large herbivores and high-trophic level 
carnivores – are likely to have keystone effects, and so their losso might well be very serious”. 
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precautionary principle is not sufficient for justifying the whole of 
conservation activities. Despite its great importance, ecological value needs to 
be integrated with other kind of values. 
 
 
5. FLOURISHING VALUE OF NATURE 
The third category of instrumental value justifies conservation because of 
nature's importance for human flourishing. By flourishing we mean here the 
development and thriving of all the peculiar qualities of our species 
concerning its non-material needs and wants. Nature does not provide us 
exclusively with ecosystem services that keep life going on our planet. She is 
also a provider of more “intangible” necessities – well-being, beauty, 
knowledge, and autonomy. From here, it is possible to build at least three 
kinds of arguments, each grounded on a different aspect of nature as a source 
of flourishing: the aspect of nature as a museum – as a place that stimulate our 
appreciation for beauty and other aesthetic qualities; the aspect of nature as a 
laboratory – as a place that stirs up our scientific curiosity and our desire to 
understand the mechanisms of life; the aspect of nature as a cathedral – as a 
place able to satisfy our instinctive desire of “otherness”, that is, to be 
somewhere else other than by ourselves. All these views of nature justify a 
sense of respect and reverence for nature that play a fundamental part in the 
life and well-being of many people. As we shall show in the last part of this 
work, this kind of values allows to complete a framework of value for 
conservation built on economic and ecological reasons. 
 
5.1 Aesthetic value of nature 
The first argument, grounded on the view of nature as a museum, appeal to  
aesthetic value to justify conservation. Natural environments, flora and fauna, 
landscapes where anthropization are harmonized with nature have always 
been a great source of aesthetic appreciation. Often, we tend to underestimate 
the importance of this kind of appreciation to many people, and underestimate 
the effectiveness of aesthetic value in building arguments in favor of 
conservation. Beauty, as a value, always faces a series of prejudices, despite the 
importance it can have on many people as a source of flourishing The beauty 
of nature is no exception. One of the main objections put forward to the use of 
aesthetic value relies on the alleged “selectivity of our tastes”. According to this 
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argument, aesthetic value cannot provide, for reasons of justice and efficiency, 
substantial grounds for conservation. 
This latter objection is justified by what seems to be the preferences of the 
majority of people: preferences for what is cute, colorful, pretty, totemic, exotic, 
big enough and dynamic, all qualities indicative of so-called charismatic 
animals. However, it would be, from an ethical standpoint, unfair, and, from 
an ecological standpoint, inefficient, to accept these kinds of preferences as 
grounds for guiding conservation policies.25 Fans of Damien Hirst may 
appreciate the exposition in a glass box of dead animal bodies infested with 
maggots. However, the same sight outside of a museum will be hardly 
appreciated by anyone. According to a widespread opinion, beauty is rare in 
nature, and it cannot ground strong arguments for conservation. 
It is possible to answer the previous objection by stressing that taste could 
be educated, and it is not necessarily limited to what we tend to appreciate at 
first sight. In particular, a mature aesthetic appreciation of nature cannot be 
separated from the acquisition of information and scientific knowledge 
regarding the object of aesthetic contemplation.26 As the knowledge of the 
relevant cultural and religious references can illuminate our experience of a 
medieval fresco, in the same way, for instance, scientifically informed 
knowledge, even at a basic educational level, on bat's echolocation can 
stimulate our interest and appreciation for the extravagant faces of these 
creatures, which we might otherwise consider repulsive. 
Aesthetic appreciation of nature must then be accompanied by at least a 
basic knowledge of the subject, in order to overcome certain limitations of our 
immediate taste. In this sense, aesthetic appreciation of nature shares some 
characteristics with the second kind of value grounded on human flourishing 
– knowledge – as was already noted by Kant in a passage of his Critique of 
Practical Reason: 
 
An observer of nature finally comes to like objects that at first offended his 
sense when he discovers in them the great purposiveness of their organization, 
so that his reason delights in contemplating them, and Leibniz spared an insect 
that he had carefully examined with a microscope and replaced it on its leaf 
 
25 For this argument see R.J. Loftis, Three Problems for the Aesthetic Foundation of 
Environmental Ethics, «Philosophy in the Contemporary World» 10-2 2003. 
26 On the link between aesthetic appreciation of nature an scientific knowledge see Y. Saito, 
Appreciating Nature on Its Terms, «Environmental Ethics» 20-2 1998, G. Parson, Natural 
Appreciation, Science, and Positive Aesthetics, «British Journal of Aesthetics» 42-3 2002, an A. 
Carlson, Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Requirement of Environmentalism, 
«Environmental Values»  10 2010. 
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because he had found himself instructed by his view of it and had, as it were, 
received a benefit from it27. 
 
 
5.2  Scientific value of nature 
The second argument, grounded on the view of nature as a laboratory, 
appeal to scientific value to justify conservation. Science, conceived as a 
human activity, is ideally unfettered by material interests, and should be 
devoted to the discovery and contemplation of the world and the universe, and 
furthermore possesses a value that transcends even its undoubted social and 
economic impact. Knowledge is just as important as beauty in defining what is 
peculiar and important in our appreciation of the natural world. If we must, 
therefore, protect the natural environment, ecosystems, and the species of the 
world because they are part of an ideal museum of beauty, we must also 
protect them because they are the subjects of study for the “laboratories” of 
naturalists, geologists, geographers, ecologists, ethologists, and various other 
kind of scientists. 
We should not think, however, that this kind of value plays an important 
role only in the lives of a select few people. In the same way that aesthetic value 
is not exclusively a patrimony of aesthetes, scientific value is not the exclusive 
patrimony of scientists, but can rather permeate into all of society thanks to 
the possibilities offered by education. The awe and reverence caused by the 
complexity and diversity of the living world are important sources of 
nourishment for the highest quality of human beings, and what is capable of 
generating wonder should not be considered  with disdain, since sources of 
wonder are limited, and should be protected. 
Beyond being, a perennial source of beauty and discoveries the natural 
world can also be considered as a source of wonder and reverence in another 
way – as something completely other from us – and this bring us to the third   
aspect of the relationship between nature and flourishing. 
 
5.3 Existential value of nature 
The last argument, grounded on the view of nature as a cathedral, appeals 
to  the existential value of nature to justify conservation. For many people, 
 
27 I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University 
Press,, 1996, p. 178. On the value of Kant's aesthetic theory for environmental aesthetic and 
ethics see P. Biasetti, From Beauty to Love: A Kantian Way to Environmental Moral Theory?, 
«Environmental Philosophy» 122-2 2015.   
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nature mirrors a moral image of existence – an image of moral autonomy – 
because it is a source of a radical “otherness” that allows them to distance 
themselves from many aspects of human life. As a species, we spend much of 
our lives designing new ways to structure and restructure the environment we 
occupy, with the aim of controlling it in an ever improving manner. This is 
probably a consequence of our ethologic endowment of clever – and highly 
destructive – primates that, for most of their evolutionary history, were hunted 
by predators much more than they hunted for prey, and, as such, had to learn 
to control their territory effectively. Thanks to our cognitive abilities, this 
instinct to control the environment has reached heights never seen before on 
this planet: the human being, from this standpoint, can be considered as the 
most inventive and effective ecosystem engineer of all the natural world. 
However, what we get in return from the hyper-controlled artificial 
environments we build is a profound sense of loneliness. This is particularly 
evident if we look at the paradigm case of this kind of space, what the French 
anthropologist Marc Augé has called non-lieux (non-places)28. Non-places are 
environments planned and built to fulfill specific functional reasons, in which 
each feature is designed according to a rigorous logic. In this way, non-places 
lack a specific identity, the possibility to build authentic relationships, and, 
historicity: the same historicity that we can find instead in traditional urban 
centers, and, paradoxically, in the nexus of relationships evolved in natural 
environments. It is important to stress here that by the word historicity we 
mean here the intertwining of contingency and intentionality (even apparent 
intentionality) that can be constructed only across a prolonged temporal 
dimension. Non-places, on the contrary, tend to exclude contingency and 
otherness as much as possible, eliminating them in favor of specific functional 
requirements. From this point of view, non-places represent the culmination of 
our ability as a species to control and to structure the environment, and every 
artificial environment tends, at least in part, towards this type of functional 
and ahistorical organization. 
This may explain why some people find a refuge in the idea – as romantic 
and idealized as it can be – of nature as a wild, unspoiled, dimension located 
beyond our control. We recognize then a value in nature because we find in 
her something which is missing in our hyper-controlled artificial environments: 
a resistance against our desires and our will, and a network of contingent 
relationships not shaped by human beings. From this perception of a radical 
and autonomous otherness perhaps comes the sense of awe that can be 
 
28 M. Augé, Non-lieux. Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité, Le Seuil, Paris 
1992. 
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experienced in front of nature. We value her because we appreciate her being 
different from us, even in spite of our instinct to transform everything we 
encounter into something more suitable to us – or even something more like 
us. 
This need for something other, different, and independent from our will is 
probably stronger in the very same moment that our capacity to control the 
environment is at its peak. This may explain, perhaps, why for many people in 
search of a refuge from modern life, it may suffice to play with a pet, or take a 
walk amongst the trees in a park in order to feel well and comfortable. For 
many others, this is not enough, and they need to live their relationship with 
the natural world by leaving the comfort and safety of modern life in a way 
that may appear to other people reckless or even senseless. 
6. REASONS FOR CONSERVATION: A COMPLEX FRAMEWORK OF 
VALUES 
It is time to draw some conclusions. In order to assess the role that the 
previous reasons can play in a complex justification for conservation it is 
necessary to find some parameters of evaluation. In our view, it is possible to 
establish four parameters of this kind. The first parameter is extension, that is, 
the capacity of a value of being a source of arguments for justifying 
conservation in all the richness of its aspects and applications. The second is 
stability, that is, the capacity of a value to be a source of arguments whose 
conclusions are not subject to changes based on social, economic, or 
technological variables. The third is weight, that is, the capacity of a value of 
being a source of arguments that can appeal on crucial and essential interests. 
The fourth is viability, that is, the capacity of a value of being a source of 
arguments that can be of practical use for prioritizing policies and 
disentangling moral conflicts arising from conservation practices. These four 
parameters reflect four specific goals of conservation: a) to protect as much 
biodiversity and natural environments as possible; b) to fulfill this task in a 
way as independent as possible from potential changes in the social and 
cultural context; c) to ground its task on an ethical necessity as strong as 
possible; d) to manage conflicts and provide order as needed in order to fulfill 
its task. 
As we have seen, the major limitation of intrinsic value theories lies in their 
metaphysical plausibility. We believe that, for these reasons, many people will 
not find them palatable. However, if we have to judge them according to the 
previous parameters, they show a large extension, a robust stability, and a 
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great strength. These are, in fact, the main reasons why they were adopted in 
the first place. Their extension is equivalent with the whole of biodiversity, and 
their stability is a maxim because, by definition, intrinsic value does not wax 
or wane with the shift of cultural, economic, and technological contexts. 
Moreover, their weight, being tied to a moral imperative, is high. At the same 
time, however, they are scarcely viable. Intrinsic values cannot be compared 
with other kinds of value. A source of intrinsic value has the same ranking 
order of other sources of intrinsic value, and is, by definition, more important 
than sources of instrumental value. 
Economic value, instead, has a limited extension. It is certainly possible to 
use economic value to justify the conservation of certain species and natural 
environments. However, the applications are few, because the only arguments 
with an unlimited scope in the economic value category – the argument of 
nature as a magic box – is flawed, and the other two – the argument of nature 
as a warehouse and the argument of nature as a playground – can be applied 
only under very specific conditions. The stability of arguments grounded of 
economic value is limited too – as it depends on highly volatile market 
conditions. The weight of arguments based on economic reason, when they 
are applicable, is, instead, high, as they can give leverage to a powerful species 
of motivation: economic self-interest. Finally, arguments of this kind are viable, 
as they provide reasons for ordering policies and entangling conflicts, even if, 
on the one hand, these reasons may conflict with ecological reasons, and, on 
the other hand, can be deemed as rather crude. 
In many ways, ecological value seems more promising than intrinsic value 
or economic value. The extension of arguments born from ecological value is 
wide – although not universal. The stability provided by these arguments is 
good, even if, again, not absolute – as, in principle, we could, by the means of 
some future technologies, replace all life-supporting services provided by 
ecosystem with artificial substitutes, having in this way no ecological reason for 
conserving biodiversity.29 Concerning weight, arguments born of ecological 
reasons once again demonstrate their force, as they appeal to our own material 
survival. Regarding viability, they provide conservationists with, on the one 
hand, sound reasons for prioritizing policies, and, on the other hand, 
principles for assessing conflicts. 
All this does not mean, in our view, that we should be content with 
ecological value, with some contribution given by economic value. We can 
 
29 On this issue see K. Lee, There is Biodiversity and Biodiversity: Implications for 
Environmental Philosophy, in M. Oksanen & J. Pietarinen, Philosophy and Biodiversity, cit. 
and D. Maier, What's So Good About Biodiversity?, cit. 
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aspire to a much more extended and stable justification of conservation – akin 
to the one reached by intrinsic value theory – by adding a new set of values to 
the framework: the values linked to human flourishing. These values, even if 
weaker in their weight than economic and ecological values, allows for a more 
comprehensive view of conservation, and, as such, should not be put aside.30 
The reasons why values grounded on human flourishing can be a source of 
arguments with great extension and stability can be found in the fundamental 
character that accompanies our aesthetic, scientific, and existential 
experiences: authenticity and disinterest. 
Concerning authenticity, it may be useful to compare experiences involving 
flourishing value and experiences involving recreational value. At first glance, 
it may be difficult to draw a clear line between the two, because they often 
come together: pleasure being a usual companion to beauty, knowledge, and 
search for otherness, and, at the same time, appreciation for beauty, wonder, 
and awe being often a result of outdoor activities. As a general rule, however, 
mere recreational activities involving nature can be replicated in an artificial 
context. Skiing, for instance, can be a fun even if practiced in an indoor slope 
in Dubai, with a temperature artificially maintained between thirty five and 
forty degrees lower than outside. Aesthetic, scientific, and existential 
experiences involving nature, instead, cannot be repeated by artificial means. 
From this standpoint, if we experience some awkwardness when skiing inside a 
concrete freezer in Dubai, it is not because we are missing the recreational 
aspect of skiing in itself, it is instead because skiing is not accompanied by the 
usual aesthetic and existential experiences that come from practicing this 
activity when surrounded by majestic mountains. 
The issue of disinterest may be grasped instead by reflecting on the 
differences between arguments involving flourishing and arguments involving 
economic and ecological reasons. The main reasons why these latter 
arguments possess a greater weight than arguments based on flourishing is 
because they appeal to  our immediate interests: economic prosperity, and 
future survival. The reasons why we appreciate nature as a source of beauty, 
knowledge, and autonomy are instead intangible, and spring forth from a set 
of preferences typical of our species lacking utility: these preferences follow 
from higher aspects of our existence, and are not, for this reason, limited by 
mere considerations of immediate interest. An example will illustrate this 
 
30 Moreover, values linked with human flourishing foster a positive climate around 
conservation. The weight of ecological and economic arguments is based on «fear»: fear of our 
extinction, impoverishment, etc. On the contrary, values linked with human flourishing exalt 
more positive reasons: love of beauty, knowledge, and what is other than us. 
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point. Troglobites are animals that lives exclusively in the depths of caves. 
They are mainly invertebrates, with some fish and amphibians included in the 
group, and often possess peculiar characteristics such as lack of pigmentation, 
a very slow metabolism, lack of eyes, and an incredibly high life expectancy. 
Many species of troglobites are at risk of extinction (not a surprise, given the 
difficulties of living in a habitat like that). Troglobites do not have any 
economic value, and it is unclear what kind of ecological services they could 
offer to the planet. They could become extinct, and we will not suffer any 
economic or ecological negative consequences. However, this lack of economic 
or ecological interest does not preclude their aesthetic, scientific, or existential 
value. It is hard, for instance, to remain indifferent in front of the transparent 
elegance of the shell of the small terrestrial snail Zospea Tholussum, which 
was discovered a few years ago in a cave in Croatia. Moreover, no one would 
be surprised by the curiosity that this kind of organisms could raise in a 
naturalist. The existence of living creatures in places so alien and inhospitable 
can generate in many of us a strong feeling of wonder and awe concerning the 
tenacity of life, and the adaptability of organism to the most incredible 
conditions. 
There are, in fact, no aspects of the natural world that cannot be deemed 
important from an aesthetic, scientific, or existential standpoint, because 
values linked to human flourishing are not tied to any utilitarian requirement: 
and for this reason they are ubiquitous, and reach a range and stability 
unknown to economic and ecological considerations. In this way, by 
integrating values linked to human flourishing to ecological and economic 
values we obtain a complex framework which is less metaphysically abstruse as 
intrinsic value theories, and functionally equivalent regarding extension and 
stability: a framework that, in this sense,  is probably the best framework of 
values justifying conservation that we can build. 
 
